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        Preferential treatment in government procurement, also known as procurement linkages, is a con-
troversial yet popular tool to achieve socio-economic goals, most importantly, affirmative action for 
certain targeted groups. This Article utilizes the recently enacted small-medium enterprise (“SME”) 
procurement linkages in China to examine the pitfalls in the design of procurement linkages. Two major 
deficiencies of the Chinese regime impede effective implementation of procurement linkages. First, 
loopholes in the Chinese regulatory regime allow large enterprises to usurp the benefits meant for SMEs 
through the use of wholly owned subsidiaries and other corporate arrangements. Second, aggrieved 
suppliers face stringent procedural requirements and limited civil remedies in their attempts to enforce 
procurement linkages, while the government procuring authority has a perverse incentive to overlook and 
even acquiesce in the violations. This Article argues that these deficiencies reflect the mistaken assump-
tion that procurement linkages should be treated as simply a conventional type of government procure-
ment. Effective reform would have to go beyond strengthening the enforcement mechanisms for conven-
tional government procurement and entails specific legislative action to tackle the particular require-
ments of the preferential policies. 
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*151 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
       The massive scale of government procurement, especially in light of the increased emphasis on public 
spending as a fiscal stimulus to combat the economic downturn, has enhanced the importance and prev-
alence of the use of government procurement as a means to achieve specific socio-economic goals. [FN1] 
One recent example is the Temporary Measures of Government Procurement to Promote the Development 
of Medium-Small Enterprises (“Temporary Measures”), [FN2] which was enacted in China in December 
2011 to implement preferential treatment of small-medium enterprises (“SMEs”) in government pro-
curement. Under the Temporary Measures, 30% of government procurement is to be reserved for SMEs, 
with SMEs also enjoying price discounts for other government procurement. [FN3] 
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       Putting aside the policy significance of China committing the equivalent of more than RMB 200 
billion of government procurement to support SMEs, [FN4] the Temporary Measures provides an illus-
trative case study on the perils in the design and enforcement of preferential policies in government 
procurement. An effective preferential policy, also known as procurement linkages, requires a carefully 
formulated definition of the intended beneficiaries*152 to ensure preferential treatments are properly 
enjoyed by the designated entities. In particular, care must be taken to prevent non-qualifying entities 
from enjoying preferential treatment through the use of creative corporate structuring and other ar-
rangements. 
 
       In addition, the common assumption that procurement linkages should be treated as a conventional 
type of government procurement and that the standard enforcement mechanisms for government pro-
curement in general should be applied to procurement linkages is misguided; the considerations under-
pinning procurement linkages are categorically different from those of conventional government pro-
curement. Laws governing conventional government procurement are built on the general principles of 
non-discrimination and “best value for the money.” [FN5] It should not be surprising that the resulting 
substantive and procedural rules are ill-equipped to ensure effective enforcement of policies requiring 
preferential treatment to certain suppliers - the antithesis of non-discrimination and “best value for 
money.” 
 
       The aforementioned problems are reflected in the two major deficiencies of the Temporary Measures. 
First, insufficient attention is directed at the risk of circumvention via the creative use of corporate 
structuring. Other jurisdictions, such as the U.S. and Europe, typically include provisions that preclude 
enterprises that are significantly owned or controlled by large enterprises from enjoying SME preferential 
treatment. [FN6] In China, loopholes in the Temporary Measures and relevant regulations defining SMEs 
allow large enterprises to usurp the benefits meant for SMEs through the use of wholly owned subsidiaries 
and other corporate arrangements. These loopholes are not legislative oversight but reflect the vested 
interests of local government and state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) in securing dominant access to gov-
ernment procurement contracts. 
 
       Second, available enforcement remedies for violations of the Temporary Measures are inadequate. 
The inadequacies of private enforcement mechanisms under the Government Procurement Law [FN7] are 
aggravated under the Temporary Measures, whereby aggrieved suppliers face stringent procedural re-
quirements*153 and limited civil remedies in their attempts to enforce the Temporary Measures. Public 
enforcement also suffers from the perverse incentives of the government procuring authority - the gov-
ernment body/department conducting the procurement - a problem unique to the context of SME pref-
erential policies. [FN8] Specifically, the government procuring authority is likely to overlook violations of 
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the Temporary Measures because such violations do not typically cause it any direct financial losses, in 
contrast to violations of the conventional government procurement regime. Overlooked violations often 
result in procurement contracts being awarded to and performed by large enterprises, an outcome that the 
government procuring authority is indifferent to and may even prefer. 
 
       This Article critically examines the Temporary Measures and considers possible reform proposals. In 
particular, the Article highlights the different challenges posed by the enforcement of government pro-
curement linkages as compared to the enforcement of conventional government procurement, and dis-
cusses why specific amendments to substantive and procedural rules and the creation of dedicated public 
enforcement agencies are necessary in ensuring effective compliance with preferential policies. In addi-
tion, the Article addresses how the definitional loopholes found in the Temporary Measures are indicative 
of the increasingly sophisticated rent-seeking behavior of vested interests in China. 
 
       This Article is organized into six parts. Part II traces the legislative formulation of the Temporary 
Measures - including the effects of China's proposed accession to the WTO's Agreement on Government 
Procurement (“GPA”) [FN9] - and lays out the specifics of SME preferential policies. Part III focuses on 
definitional issues relating to SMEs. Through a comparative analysis of U.S. and European approaches, 
Part III identifies China's oscillation between industry-specific and uniform definitions and analyzes 
current loopholes. Part IV examines the inadequacies of available private and public enforcement 
mechanisms and also *154 discusses how the GPA's domestic review procedures are ineffective in ad-
dressing the enforcement concerns of procurement linkages like the Temporary Measures. Part V high-
lights the conceptual distinction between conventional government procurement and preferential policies 
and discusses possible reform proposals. Part VI concludes with thoughts on legal reform for China's 
procurement linkages. 
 
II. THE LAW AND CONTEXT 
 
A. Backdrop of SME Development Polices 
 
       1. SMEs and Chinese Economic Reform 
 
       Emphasis on promoting private small business has traditionally been a prominent mainstay in the 
economic development and commercial policies of many jurisdictions. [FN10] By contrast, SMEs were 
generally neglected or even treated with hostility in the early phases of China's market transition. [FN11] 
Despite over thirty years of market reform, many structural problems persist. Barriers to entry, whether 
officially sanctioned or otherwise present, are common in many industries, to the detriment of private 
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SMEs. [FN12] The regulatory burdens facing SMEs are also onerous and often discriminatory. [FN13] 
The difficulty of SME financing, [FN14] for *155 example, remains a common obstacle to SME growth 
and development. [FN15] Notwithstanding the higher default risk of SMEs, [FN16] discrimination 
against private entities in favor of SOEs presents a major problem. [FN17] SMEs are also significantly 
disadvantaged and deprived of fair competition opportunities in government procurement. [FN18] 
 
       The recognition of the contribution of SMEs in reducing unemployment, mitigating the urban-rural 
divide, and stimulating technological innovation [FN19] has prompted a more favorable legal and policy 
environment for SMEs in recent times. A policy paper promulgated by the State Council General Office in 
2000 represents the first concerted attempt by the government to address the development needs of SMEs. 
[FN20] Two years later, this process culminated in a specific piece of legislation, the Law on the Pro-
motion of Medium-Small Enterprises. [FN21] 
 
       2. Existing Laws and Policies on SME Support 
 
       The Law on the Promotion of Medium-Small Enterprises provides for government support of SME 
development in a variety of areas. There is a special SME development fund that can be used to support 
SME credit guarantees, technological innovation,*156 professional enhancement, and other strategic 
development plans. [FN22] There are also provisions directed at improving SMEs' access to financial 
services, credit facilities, and capital. [FN23] Preferential tax treatment is specifically provided for in the 
legislation, [FN24] as is the reduction of bureaucratic red tape faced by SMEs. [FN25] The subject of 
technological innovation by SMEs received substantial attention and its own chapter. [FN26] Finally, 
Article 34 expressly provides for priority in government procurement. A flurry of regulations and policy 
measures were promulgated pursuant to this new law, with great emphasis on enhancing SME access to 
financial services, credit facilities, and capital. [FN27] Preferential tax treatment was also specified in 
subsequent tax regulations. [FN28] Finally, specific policies were formulated to support SMEs that are 
involved in technological innovations. [FN29] 
 
       Academic evaluations of these measures have been mixed. While recognizing that steps have been 
taken toward supporting SME development, a common critique among commentators and *157 aca-
demics is the lack of a comprehensive and coordinated approach. [FN30] Implementation of the policies is 
found wanting at times. [FN31] In addition, the lack of effective fair competition laws exacerbates the 
competitive disadvantages of SMEs. [FN32] There are also calls for more concrete and substantial tax 
preferential policies for SMEs. [FN33] The need for further reform is recognized in the special SMEs 
report prepared by the State Council in December 2009. Areas identified in the report include tax and 
other preferential policies, assistance in SME financing, and institutional support for SMEs, among others. 
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[FN34] 
 
B. Government Procurement in China 
 
       The various policies implemented pursuant to the Law on the Promotion of Medium-Small Enter-
prises rendered the priority of SMEs in government procurement a conspicuous and surprising absence. 
The role of government procurement in achieving policy goals such as SME development is well recog-
nized by international legal and policy circles. [FN35] In the U.S., the Small Business Act of 1953 spe-
cifically provided for SMEs contracting in federal procurements going back to the immediate post-war 
period. [FN36] SME preferences in Japan's government procurement have also been legislated since 1966. 
[FN37] Facilitation of SME participation in government contracts has received specific attention in the 
procurement policies of the European Commission since the 1990s. [FN38] Given the significant value of 
Chinese government*158 procurement, [FN39] such an omission deprives SME development of a po-
tentially potent policy measure. 
 
       1. Infancy of the Chinese Government Procurement Regime 
 
       One possible reason for the delay in SME procurement policy reform is the relatively short history of 
government procurement law in China. Prior to the economic reforms of the 1980s, the need to ensure 
competition and transparency in government procurement was deemed unnecessary, as the economy was 
dominated by the state and SOEs. [FN40] A meaningful notion of government procurement emerged after 
1995, with cities in economically developed regions (e.g., Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Zhuhai) establishing 
local rules relating to government procurement. [FN41] The Government Procurement Law was enacted 
in 2002 to provide a more established framework to regulate government procurement nationally. [FN42] 
However, economic statistics on the ratio of government procurement in relation to total GDP and overall 
government expenditure suggest that the operation and regulation of the Chinese government procure-
ment market remains in its early development stage, even 10 years after the enactment of the Government 
Procurement Law. [FN43] 
 
       The infancy of China's government procurement regime, however, does not fully explain the delay in 
SME procurement policy reform. The Government Procurement Law expressly provides that government 
procurement should assist in the realization*159 of national, social, and economic policy goals, including 
the promotion of SME development. [FN44] In fact, the Chinese government has utilized government 
procurement to promote products that are “indigenously innovated,” “energy-saving,” and “environ-
mentally friendly” since 2006. [FN45] In contrast, the procurement linkages to support SMEs were only 
implemented in 2012. 
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       2. Role of the WTO GPA 
 
       Another possible contributing factor to the delay in SME procurement policy reform is China's 
pending accession to the GPA. The GPA is a plurilateral agreement covering government procurement 
and applies only to WTO members who choose to be party to it. Membership in the GPA comes with the 
obligation to comply with various transparency and non-discrimination provisions in exchange for access 
to the government procurement markets of other members. [FN46] China first submitted a formal appli-
cation for membership to the GPA in 2007 and is currently negotiating accession in the context of its 
second application, submitted in 2010. [FN47] The promise of transparency arising from compliance with 
the GPA potentially provides fresh impetus for reform of China's government procurement regime. 
[FN48] 
 
       One potential complication arising from the accession to the GPA is that SME preferential policies in 
government procurement violate several GPA provisions. [FN49] These include Article 7(b) (“any con-
ditions for participation in tendering procedures shall be limited to those which are essential to ensure the 
firm's capability to fulfill the contract in question.”), Article 10 (selective tendering procedures), and Ar-
ticle 16 (restrictions on offsets). [FN50] SME linkages are also commonly structured with a *160 na-
tionality requirement, which violates Article 3 (national treatment and non-discrimination) and Article 15 
(limited tendering procedures mandate non-discrimination between domestic and foreign suppliers). 
[FN51] 
 
       Interestingly, the GPA does not necessarily prevent SME procurement linkages because the potential 
contracting parties to the GPA may negotiate for exemption of such policies from coverage in market 
access provisions, as is the case with Canada, Korea, Japan, and the U.S. [FN52] China has insisted in its 
application for accession to the GPA that it be free to maintain its industrial and social policies (including 
support for SMEs) through government procurement. [FN53] Therefore, while the GPA presents an ob-
stacle in the implementation of SME preferential policies, the obstacle is not insurmountable. 
 
       3. Path to the Temporary Measures 
 
       The delay in the development of SME procurement linkages is not adequately explained by the in-
fancy of the Chinese government procurement regime or China's pending accession to the GPA. The delay 
may ultimately be due to this issue's relative lack of political salience compared to other contemporaneous 
legislative initiatives. 
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       With the special SMEs report by the State Council in December 2009, a timeline was introduced for 
enacting relevant regulations by the end of 2010. [FN54] While further delay ensued, some progress was 
made by the Shanghai municipal government, which began implementing a locally enacted SME pref-
erential treatment regime on January 1, 2010. [FN55] It was only during the last week of 2011 that the 
Temporary Measures was finally introduced. [FN56] 
 
C. Specifics of Preferential Policies 
 
       Government procurement is the process in which a government entity (the government procuring 
authority) sources for *161 goods and services from enterprises (the suppliers). Public tender is the usual 
default method used to select the supplier, although competitive negotiations, single source purchases, and 
other methods may be employed in situations where public tender is not feasible (e.g. too few potential 
suppliers). 
 
       The Temporary Measures provides two concrete measures to support SMEs in government pro-
curement. First, 30% of the government procurement budget is reserved for SMEs. Of this 30%, at least 
60% is reserved for small and micro enterprises. [FN57] This quota may be varied and reduced in ac-
cordance with the requirements of government operations and public service needs, i.e. a government 
procuring authority may set aside a lower proportion of government procurement budget for SMEs on 
account of operational needs. [FN58] The second measure is price discount. For procurement projects that 
are not reserved for SMEs, small and micro enterprises enjoy a 6-10% discount from their submitted bid. 
[FN59] The precise discount is decided by the relevant procuring authority/agent. [FN60] 
 
       Consortiums that include small and micro enterprises are also encouraged to bid for procurement 
projects not reserved for SMEs. Article 6 provides for a 2-3% discount to the bids of consortiums that have 
at least 30% of the contract sum subcontracted to small and micro SMEs. If the consortium consists en-
tirely of small and micro enterprises, then the consortium can either participate in the procurement pro-
jects specifically reserved for SMEs under Article 4 or enjoy a 6-10% discount under Article 5. To prevent 
abuse and circumvention, it is stipulated that large-medium enterprises and other entities in the consortium 
should not have any “investment relationship” with the small and micro enterprises. [FN61] 
 
       In terms of sub-contracting, Article 7 of the Temporary Measures prohibits sub-contracting or transfer 
of contract by the winning party to an entity larger than itself. By contrast, sub-contracting to SMEs is 
encouraged, with those sub-contracts constituting*162 SME procurement. [FN62] This is significant 
because Article 12 of the Temporary Measures mandates that government departments prepare annual 
reports on the amount of SME participation in government procurement. These annual reports are sub-
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mitted to the relevant Ministry of Finance departments and are subject to public disclosure. Government 
departments that predominantly award their procurement contracts to large enterprises can still present 
respectable statistics of SME participation if the awarded contracts are sub-contracted to SMEs. Other 
supplementary measures include “appropriate support” for SMEs in deposits, payment due dates, and 
payment methods; [FN63] credit guarantees in government procurement to provide guarantee services for 
SMEs; [FN64] and training and consultation services to assist SMEs in navigating the government pro-
curement process. [FN65] 
 
III. DEFINING SMES: PITFALLS AND CHALLENGES 
 
       Laws and policies that purport to grant preferences to SMEs will inevitably have to grapple with the 
definition of SMEs. A carefully formulated definition of SMEs that is neither over-inclusive nor un-
der-inclusive is crucial to ensure that policy preferences are properly enjoyed by the intended entities. This 
part examines two definition-based issues surrounding Chinese SME procurement linkages, namely, the 
tension between a specific vs. general definition of SMEs and the problem of circumvention. 
 
A. Current Definition of SMEs 
 
       The definitions found in the Temporary Measures are derived from existing regulations and are 
supplemented by additional qualifying requirements. [FN66] The most recent Notice on the Categoriza-
tion of Medium-Small Enterprises classifies SMEs into “medium,” “small,” and “micro” based on factors 
such as number of employees, business revenue, and total assets and also other industry-specific charac-
teristics. [FN67] The enterprises are divided into 15 industrial categories with an additional catch-all *163 
provision for non-specified industries. [FN68] There are significant size variations across industrial cat-
egories. For example, a micro enterprise in the retail sector can have a maximum of 10 employees and 1 
million RMB annual business revenue. [FN69] By contrast, a micro enterprise in the property manage-
ment industry can have up to 100 employees and an annual turnover of 5 million RMB. [FN70] 
 
       In addition to the aforementioned requirements for capital, revenue, and employment, the Temporary 
Measures requires that the goods and services provided by the enterprises be either self-produced or 
produced by other SMEs. [FN71] There is also a prohibition on sub-contracting by SMEs to larger en-
terprises. [FN72] 
 
       Due to the current lack of an authoritative classification body in China and the inability of govern-
ment procuring authorities to determine SME status, [FN73] the Temporary Measures relies on a 
self-declaratory mechanism for SME classification. SMEs participating in government procurement are 
30 UCLAPBLJ 149 Page 13 
30 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 149 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
required to confirm their SME status via a standard declaration form that repeats the definition criteria set 
out in Article 2. The declaration form provides for “legal liability in accordance with the law” for false 
declaration. [FN74] 
 
B. Tension between Industry-Specific and Uniform Definitions 
 
       At first glance, the current approach toward defining SMEs appears to be uncontroversial. However, a 
historical and comparative analysis of the situation reveals an ongoing tension between industry-specific 
and uniform approaches to defining SMEs. 
 
       1. China's Oscillation 
 
       The evolution of the Chinese definition of SMEs reveals an oscillation between industry-specific and 
more generalized classification standards. Prior to the enactment of the Law on the Promotion of Me-
dium-Small Enterprises in 2002, SMEs were *164 classified under the Standards for Classifying Large, 
Medium, and Small Industrial Enterprises (1988). [FN75] This 1988 regulation adopted a highly indus-
try-specific classification approach that not only differentiated between 19 different sub-categories of 
industry, [FN76] but also further distinguished the product lines within each sub-category. For example, 
within the tobacco industry sub-category, the regulation differentiated classification standards for enter-
prises that produce cigarettes and enterprises that engage in tobacco redrying. [FN77] 
 
       The Standards for Classifying Large, Medium, and Small Industrial Enterprises (1988) was enacted in 
the context of China's planned economy and was primarily intended for statistical and macro-management 
purposes. [FN78] The Law on the Promotion of Medium-Small Enterprises, introduced in 2002, de-
manded a more refined definition of SMEs to meet the new policy objective of SME development. The 
Interim Provisions on the Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises (2003) was enacted to replace the 
Standards for Classifying Large, Medium, and Small Industrial Enterprises (1988). [FN79] The new 2003 
regulation substantially modified the prior industry-specific approach. Under the Interim Provisions on 
the Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises (2003), there were only five different standards for five 
categories: industrial; construction; transport and postal; wholesale and retail; and hospitality and food 
and beverages. [FN80] 
 
       It is interesting to note the reversal in approach by the most recent Notice on the Categorization of 
Medium-Small Enterprises, which replaces the Interim Provisions on the Standards *165 for Medium and 
Small Enterprises (2003). [FN81] Adopting a more detailed industry-specific approach similar to the 1988 
regulation, enterprises are now classified into 15 industrial categories, with a catch-all provision for 
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non-specified industries. [FN82] 
 
       2. Comparative Perspectives from Europe and the U.S. 
 
       From a comparative perspective, the Chinese evolution of the definition of SMEs represents the 
ongoing tension between the two major approaches to the definition of SMEs in the international arena. 
On one side is the European approach, a one-size-fits-all definition for SMEs regardless of industry var-
iation. The SME definition promulgated by the European Commission focuses solely on staff headcounts 
and financial ceilings without taking into account industry-specific variation. The headcount and turnover 
limits of medium-sized, small, and micro enterprises are, 250 and 50 million Euros; 50 and 10 million 
Euros; and 10 and 2 million Euros, respectively. [FN83] 
 
       The United States represents the other side of the spectrum. The U.S. small business definition relies 
on the North American Industrial Classification System as a baseline classification for the various in-
dustry-specific definitions of small business. [FN84] Various industries are classified into 17 different 
basic sectors, with numerous sub-sectors within each, and further product classifications within each 
sub-sector. [FN85] For example, the agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting category is divided into 
five sub-sectors of crop production; animal production; forestry and logging; fishing, hunting and trapping; 
and support activities for agriculture and forestry. The sub-sector of crop production is further divided into 
30 product classifications based on crop (e.g., soybean, strawberry, mushroom, grape, apple, sugar beet). 
In total, there are over one thousand classification categories. [FN86] The various size limits under the 
different product classifications *166 within each sub-sector tend to be identical. For example, all the 30 
product classifications under the crop production sub-sector have a size standard of $0.75 million annual 
turnover. [FN87] Nonetheless, there can be significant variations in size definitions between these product 
classifications. Within the sub-sector of animal production, the product classifications of beef cattle 
ranching and chicken meat production both have a size limit of $0.75 million, while the product classi-
fications of cattle feedlots and chicken egg production have a size limit of $2 million and $12.5 million 
respectively. 
 
       3. Analysis 
 
       The tension surrounding the approach to defining SMEs was recognized in the legislative debate 
preceding the Law on the Promotion of Medium-Small Enterprises. In 2001, when the Law on the Pro-
motion of Medium-Small Enterprises was being discussed in the National People's Congress Standing 
Committee, the two contrasting approaches for defining SMEs - one-size-fits-all and industry-specific - 
were advanced and debated. The resolution of the debate is somewhat curious and perhaps explains the 
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oscillation in the Chinese approach. Deferring to the bureaucratic expertise in industrial and economic 
policies, the Standing Committee preferred to leave the precise definition to future regulations because the 
relevant regulatory authorities were simultaneously in the process of formulating the definitions. [FN88] 
In terms of the debate between industry-specific and uniform approaches, however, both were “considered 
and used as reference” for the final proposed provision. [FN89] While the final provision only reflects an 
industry-specific approach, [FN90] the lip service paid to the uniform definition suggests that there was 
substantial support for this approach among legislators and regulatory authorities at the time of promul-
gation. This may also help explain why a conservative, industry-specific categorization approach of only 
five categories was initially adopted. 
 
        *167 Chinese academic Liu Qingfei argues that the Chinese Interim Provisions on the Standards for 
Medium and Small Enterprises (2003) provided for an overbroad definition of SMEs that not only ignored 
the variation in various industries but also the geographical imbalance in economic development. [FN91] 
Similar criticisms can be levied against the European one-size-fits-all approach. [FN92] Such a uniform 
approach can lead to both over-inclusion of firms that are actually considered large for a particular in-
dustry and under-inclusion of firms in industries that tend to have a higher turnover and headcount. 
Nonetheless, the chief advantage of the European approach and the Chinese Interim Provisions on the 
Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises (2003) is the simplicity of their administration. This is es-
pecially so for enterprises whose business activities straddle different industry specifications. For example, 
a holiday resort is arguably involved in both the hospitality business and the food and beverage business. 
These two business activities are classified as a single category under the Interim Provisions on the 
Standards for Medium and Small Enterprises (2003) [FN93] but are considered two distinct categories 
under the Notice on the Categorization of Medium-Small Enterprises (2011). [FN94] Government pro-
curement authorities and bidding enterprises have less difficulty ascertaining small business status with 
only one or a few standards to evaluate. Conversely, overly-detailed industry categorizations (e.g., the U.S. 
approach), serve to increase administrative costs in determining the appropriate industry categorization 
that does not have any material impact on the size specification. 
 
       Observed in this light, the most recent Notice on the Categorization of Medium-Small Enterprises 
arguably represents a sensible compromise between ease of administration and sensitivity to specific 
industry conditions. 
 
C. Risks of Abuse and Circumvention 
 
       The more problematic definition-based issue is the circumvention of laws by large enterprises mas-
querading as SMEs or otherwise usurping the preferential treatment meant for SMEs. While the Tem-
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porary Measures includes some measures to address potential abuses, this section identifies and discusses 
the various methods in which large enterprises may nonetheless circumvent the law. 
 
        *168 1. Comparative Perspectives from Europe and the U.S. 
 
       In the United States, circumvention of preferential policies for small business is dealt with through the 
concept of affiliation. The U.S. concept of affiliation between businesses focuses on control. Control is 
defined broadly and includes not only situations in which control is exercised but also situations in which 
the power to control exists. [FN95] A holistic approach that considers various factors such as ownership, 
management, previous relationships/ties, and contractual relationships is used to determine affiliation, 
[FN96] with special attention paid to stock ownership, [FN97] stock options, [FN98] common manage-
ment, [FN99] identity of interest, [FN100] the newly organized concern rule, [FN101] joint venture, 
[FN102] and franchise and license agreements. [FN103] In addition, the reality of negative control is 
recognized. Namely, minority shareholding can constitute affiliation if the minority shareholder can 
prevent a quorum or otherwise veto the enterprise's actions. [FN104] There is also the requirement that the 
employees of any given small business perform at least 50% of the awarded contract. [FN105] Once af-
filiation is established, all receipts, employees, and other measures of the size of the affiliate will be in-
cluded in its size determination. [FN106] 
 
       European regulation, on the other hand, divides enterprises into three categories: autonomous, part-
nered, and linked. [FN107] Autonomous enterprises are totally independent (i.e. hold less than 25% of 
shares in other enterprises and have less than 25% of their shares held by other enterprises) and are con-
sidered a single entity for headcount and turnover purposes. [FN108] Partner enterprises either hold 25% 
to 50% of shares of other enterprises or have 25% to 50% of their shares held by other enterprises. An 
enterprise must add the headcount and turnover of other partner enterprises in proportion to the shares held. 
[FN109] Linked enterprises are an “economic situation of enterprises which form a *169 group through 
direct or indirect control of the majority of voting rights of an enterprise by another or through the ability 
to exercise a dominant influence on an enterprise.” [FN110] Linked enterprises include those whose 
majority shareholding is owned by another enterprise or situations in which one enterprise is entitled to 
appoint or remove a majority of management. [FN111] All of the headcount and turnover of each linked 
enterprise is included in the total headcount and turnover. [FN112] 
 
       2. Lacuna in Related Companies under Chinese Law 
 
       The Notice on the Categorization of Medium-Small Enterprises was promulgated pursuant to the Law 
on the Promotion of Medium-Small Enterprises. [FN113] The devised categorization standard takes into 
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account the whole spectrum of SME support measures provided for under the Law on the Promotion of 
Medium-Small Enterprises and therefore does not take into account the requirements of any specific SME 
support measures. It is thus commendable that the Temporary Measures supplements the definition with 
an additional requirement that the goods and services provided by enterprises be either self-produced or 
produced by other SMEs. [FN114] The Temporary Measures also prohibits sub-contracting by SMEs to 
larger enterprises. [FN115] This is an important requirement in the context of government procurement 
because the benefit of awarding contracts to SMEs would be easily diluted if the SME was merely a 
conduit for goods and services provided by large enterprises. This is akin to the U.S. requirement that at 
least 50% of the contract must be performed by employees of the small business [FN116] and represents 
an improvement over the European model, which completely lacks similar restrictions. [FN117] As per 
the official press conference introducing the Temporary Measures, the additional requirements are meant 
to avoid directing profits from government contracts to large enterprises that supply goods and services to 
SMEs. [FN118] 
 
       Despite the aforementioned safeguards, there are still ways for preferential treatment of SMEs under 
the Temporary Measures to be hijacked by large enterprises. The most obvious way *170 is through the 
deliberate establishment of subsidiaries by large enterprises that individually satisfy the requirements of 
SME status. With the legal recognition of one-member limited liability companies since 2005, [FN119] an 
enterprise that meets the headcount and turnover size limits will be classified as an SME under the law 
even if that enterprise is actually wholly owned and controlled by a large enterprise. 
 
       Despite the cause for concern that this circumvention loophole presents, the possibility of circum-
vention via related subsidiaries is only recognized in the context of consortium bids under Article 6. Ar-
ticle 6 stipulates that there shall be no “investment relationship” among the various enterprises in a con-
sortium. However, there is nothing prohibiting a wholly owned subsidiary of a large enterprise from par-
ticipating in government procurement as an SME under Articles 4 and 5. Such an SME can compete for 
government procurement specifically reserved for SMEs or enjoy the significant 6-10% price discount in 
general procurement. In addition, the wording of Article 6 is ambiguous such that it can be interpreted to 
allow for an “investment relationship” between small and micro enterprises in a consortium bid. [FN120] 
This potentially allows for a consortium that is eligible for SME preferential treatment but is comprised 
entirely of small and micro enterprises that are wholly owned by one enterprise. This is aggravated by the 
current definition of SMEs, in which only three of the industrial categories include “asset amount” as a 
size specification. [FN121] As for the other categories, extensive shareholding in other enterprises does 
not disqualify an enterprise from obtaining SME status. Moreover, asset amount is only an alternative 
requirement for those three categories, i.e., an enterprise with multi-million dollar assets (including 
ownership of other enterprises) would still qualify as an SME so long as its number of employees is below 
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a certain threshold. 
 
*171 D. Closing the Loopholes 
 
       Given the common concerns and corresponding anti-circumvention provisions in U.S. and European 
regulations, the lacuna in China's regulations becomes all the more so unfortunate. The solution to the 
problem is seemingly obvious: China should adopt similar types of restrictions on ownership and control 
by large enterprises. The U.S. concept of affiliation focuses on control. [FN122] Its strength is its weak-
ness. Control is conceptualized broadly to include even negative control by a minority shareholder. This is 
an effective approach to dealing with a wide range of possible circumvention methods by large enterprises 
but also introduces elements of uncertainty to legitimate corporate structuring. For example, granting veto 
power to a minority shareholder in a bona fide attempt to safeguard the investment interests of the mi-
nority shareholder may inadvertently nullify the small business status of that enterprise. The problem of 
uncertainty is aggravated by the fact that once affiliation is established, all the receipts, employees, and 
other measures of the affiliate are included in size determinations. [FN123] In comparison, European 
regulations recognize an intermediate category of “partnered” enterprise in which only the headcount and 
turnover in proportion to ownership or shareholding is added. [FN124] Nonetheless, the European focus 
on ownership that exceeds 25% is a weakness in its regulatory regime and leaves open considerable room 
for manipulation by large business and government agencies. [FN125] In any event, either the U.S. or 
European approach would be a marked improvement over the current approach in China. 
 
       The more interesting and less obvious question is why so little has been done to close these loopholes. 
An analysis of the relevant Chinese legislative history reveals that the lacuna in the Chinese definition of 
SMEs is not indicative of legislative oversight. The danger of circumvention via corporate structuring was 
recognized during the legislative process leading up to the Law on the Promotion of Medium-Small En-
terprises in 2001. There was initially a provision that stipulated that the preferential policies in the Law on 
the Promotion of Medium-Small Enterprises would not be applicable to SMEs with more than 25% 
shareholding or investment by large enterprises. [FN126] However, this provision was omitted in the final 
version. [FN127] The official reason provided *172 in the record of the National People's Congress is that 
“some commissioners and some local and regulatory authorities” opined that such SMEs should still be 
covered by the law because the primary investment, even if by a large enterprise, is still “within the do-
main of SMEs.” [FN128] This is a circular and unconvincing argument that ignores the risk of circum-
vention and abuses by large enterprises masquerading as SMEs. 
 
       Another perspective afforded by the legislative history of the Law on the Promotion of Medi-
um-Small Enterprises is that because, at the time, the classification of SMEs had not yet been finalized, the 
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drafters preferred to accord full discretion to the relevant regulatory body (i.e., the State Council) in 
stipulating the appropriate SME classifications. [FN129] However, this rationale was not proffered as a 
justification for the removal of the provision. 
 
       The removal of the aforementioned limitation provision may have also resulted from the influence of 
locally-vested interests of SOEs and local authorities who have significant investments in the form of 
SMEs. Notwithstanding the increasing contribution of private enterprises to China's economy, SOEs 
remain major players and dominate the list of large enterprises in China. [FN130] SOEs, often owned at 
the local governmental level, are also crucial to the political and economic interests of local government. 
[FN131] Not surprisingly, SOEs have dominated China's government procurement, usually at the expense 
of foreign and non-SOE domestic suppliers. [FN132] Indeed, one policy utilized by the government 
procuring authorities is the awarding of contracts to enterprises that are owned and controlled by the same 
government procuring authority. [FN133] It is telling that under the Government Procurement Law, the 
prohibition on conflict of interests between the government procuring authority and the supplier is only 
restricted at the individual level, i.e. the management personnel of the supplier and the persons making 
procurement *173 decision for the government procuring authority must not be related or otherwise have 
conflicts of interest. [FN134] There is no prohibition, however, of investment relationships between 
suppliers and the government procuring authority. [FN135] Thus, a small-scale enterprise with substantial 
ownership by a local government body is perfectly entitled to both participate in the government pro-
curement of that government body and enjoy SME preferential treatment. This practice not only raises 
serious conflict of interests issues, but also defeats the rationale for SME preferential treatment - helping 
enterprises that otherwise have difficulty accessing government procurement contracts. SOEs, by virtue of 
their state-ownership, are not disadvantaged in the government procurement process, even if they may 
individually meet the size requirements of SMEs. 
 
       Seen in this light, the inclusion of SMEs owned and controlled by large enterprises in the SME 
preferential policy scheme is consistent with the approach under the Government Procurement Law, 
which allows enterprises owned by the state to participate in government procurement without hindrance. 
Subsequent regulations that specifically address the definition of SMEs, including the most recent June 
2011 definition, [FN136] have also maintained this approach. In light of what is at stake in this issue for 
those vested interests of SOEs and local government, if any definition reform is to take place, the Chinese 
government must become truly committed to the idea of supporting the development of privately-owned 
SMEs. 
 
IV. ENFORCEMENT: AN INCENTIVES PERSPECTIVE 
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       A law without enforcement rings hollow. This Part critically examines the enforcement mechanisms 
of the Temporary Measures. From an incentives perspective, this Part highlights how the lack of private 
enforcement mechanisms (i.e. litigation) is aggravated by the perverse incentives of the government 
procuring authority in acquiescing to manipulation of the preferential treatment scheme under the Tem-
porary Measures. 
 
*174 A. Lack of Private Enforcement Mechanisms 
 
       Suppliers in compliance with the government procurement regime are the parties most affected by its 
violation and are accordingly the parties with the strongest incentive to ensure that the law surrounding 
government procurement is followed. [FN137] Their ground-level perspectives also place them in the 
right position to detect violations and raise complaints. An effective enforcement mechanism for gov-
ernment procurement should thus allow suppliers in compliance to play a significant role in monitoring 
violations. [FN138] This can be achieved through granting legal rights and standing to affected suppliers 
in order to allow them to lodge complaints and by creating a provision for adequate remedies to be im-
plemented upon successful challenge. 
 
       1. A Challenge Procedure for Aggrieved Suppliers 
 
       Private enforcement is covered in Article 16 of the Temporary Measures, which provides that any 
contravention of law or regulation by government procuring authorities, procuring agencies, or SMEs 
during government procurement shall be governed by the Government Procurement Law and relevant 
laws and regulations. Chapter 6 of the Government Procurement Law sets out the relevant procedures for 
complaints by suppliers regarding the conduct of government procurement. Any complaints by suppliers 
are to be directed in written form to the relevant procuring authority within seven days of first obtaining 
knowledge that one's rights and interests were harmed. [FN139] The government procuring authority is to 
respond within seven working days. [FN140] If the complaint is not properly dealt with by the response or 
if the procuring authority does not respond within the stipulated timeframe, the complainant may appeal to 
the supervising authority, [FN141] here the Ministry of Finance. [FN142] The supervising authority is to 
review the complaint and render its decision within thirty working days of receiving the complaint. 
[FN143] If the complainant is unsatisfied with the decision of the supervising authority,*175 he may then 
proceed to apply for administrative review or administrative litigation. [FN144] 
 
       Two limitations of the private enforcement mechanism are clear. First, the scope of persons who can 
initiate challenges under the specified procedure is limited. Chinese academics interpreting Article 52 
have suggested that it excludes suppliers whose rights are only potentially but not actually harmed. 
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[FN145] Thus, potential suppliers who do not actually participate in government procurement are not 
entitled to initiate complaint proceedings even if their failure to participate is attributable to others' vio-
lations during of government procurement laws (e.g., the discriminative bid requirement). [FN146] While 
there is sufficient ambiguity in the wording of Article 52 to support a broader interpretation of the standing 
requirement, [FN147] the more restrictive view has been adopted in the interpretation of the law by the 
supervisory authority. [FN148] This restriction is also perpetuated in the proposed draft of the imple-
mentation regulations for the Government Procurement Law. [FN149] This indicates that the narrow 
interpretation, which excludes standing for potential suppliers, is the prevailing interpretation in Chinese 
legal circles. 
 
        *176 Second, exhausting the administrative complaint procedure is a prerequisite for initiating ad-
ministrative review or administrative litigation under Article 58. [FN150] This can pose an undue and 
costly delay for the complainant, particularly when there is an acute lack of independence on the part of 
the government body handling the complaint. [FN151] The government procuring authority whose pro-
curement is the subject of the complaint also handles the complaint. Furthermore, the subject matter of 
judicial review is the decision of the administrative supervising authority (i.e. whether the complaint has 
been properly handled by the administrative supervising authority) and not the substantive inquiry into the 
award or performance of the government procurement contract itself. [FN152] This limited and deferen-
tial judicial review scheme means that only the most egregious bias or errors by the administrative su-
pervising authority will be remedied. This has led to calls to abolish the prerequisite of exhausting the 
administrative complaint procedure prior to initiating judicial review. [FN153] 
 
       These limitations arguably account for the low number of administrative or judicial reviews in prac-
tice. In the first seven years after the Government Procurement Law went into effect, there were only 62 
administrative review cases received by the Ministry of Finance. Even after taking into account the ad-
ministrative review cases received by local branches, the total is still only slightly over 200. [FN154] The 
absence of a comprehensive survey of judicial review precludes a precise account of the utilization of 
judicial review. Nonetheless, Chinese commentators and academics commonly opine that such cases are 
rare. [FN155] 
 
       2. Limitations of Remedies 
 
       Criminal and administrative liabilities are the primary sanctions envisaged under the Government 
Procurement Law. [FN156] Violators of the provisions of the Government Procurement Law *177 are 
typically subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. In addition, and when available, corrective 
action is taken. [FN157] However, the Government Procurement Law mostly relies on existing adminis-
30 UCLAPBLJ 149 Page 22 
30 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 149 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
trative regulations and criminal law provisions and only occasionally supplements it with additional 
provisions imposing a fine. For example, Article 76 provides that any improper handling of procurement 
documents is subject to a fine of between 20,000 and 100,000 RMB, with individuals involved subject to 
administrative punishment and criminal liability “in accordance [with] the law.” [FN158] The sole ex-
ceptions are sanctions for false declarations of information and bribery by a supplier. Article 77 provides 
that such violations are subject to fines of between 0.5% to 1.0% of the contract amount. The guilty sup-
plier is also blacklisted and prohibited from participating in government procurement for one to three 
years. Any illegal gains will be forfeited as well. In addition, the business license of the supplier may be 
revoked for serious violations. It is noteworthy that the extensive sanctions under Article 77 are the only 
provisions in the chapter on legal liability that address violations by the supplier. All of the other provi-
sions address violations by the government procuring authority and relevant regulatory authority. [FN159] 
 
       For an aggrieved supplier challenging violations by the government procuring authority, three rem-
edies are available. The applicability of the remedies is dependent on the stage of the procurement process 
at the time of challenge. If the procurement process has not concluded, the improper procurement process 
will be terminated. [FN160] If the procurement process has concluded but the contract has not been 
performed, the contract shall be voided and re-awarded to other qualifying suppliers. [FN161] If the *178 
contract has been performed, monetary compensation payable by the government procuring authority is 
the remedy. [FN162] All three remedies hinge on whether the violations by the government procuring 
authority fall under Article 71 and Article 72 of the Government Procurement Act. As will be discussed 
further below, a key issue is whether violations of the Temporary Measures are covered by these Articles. 
[FN163] 
 
       In terms of monetary remedies, Article 79 provides that a party in violation of Articles 71, 72, and 77 
is liable for civil compensation for any losses caused by the violation. [FN164] While this seems to pro-
vide for a generous and far-reaching civil liability, it is important to recognize that the provision does not 
independently create a new cause of action for aggrieved suppliers or other parties. Civil liability under 
Article 79 is to be determined in accordance with relevant civil law and regulations. [FN165] Thus, in 
addition to proving violations of Articles 71, 72, or 77, an aggrieved party seeking civil compensation 
under Article 79 also carries the burden of articulating how such violations constitute civil liability under 
existing civil laws and regulations. [FN166] 
 
       This poses significant problems for an aggrieved supplier seeking civil compensation for violations 
by a government procuring authority during the government procurement process. Violations by the 
government procuring authority can cause significant and real financial loss to those suppliers partici-
pating in government procurement. An undue preference for a particular supplier, for example, deprives 
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other competing suppliers from fair consideration. A supplier who would have otherwise won a bid (but 
for the undue preference for another supplier expressed by the relevant procuring authority) also loses the 
potential*179 profit from the contract. However, because there is still no contractual relationship between 
the government procuring authority and the aggrieved supplier at this point, the government procuring 
authority is only subject to limited pre-contractual obligations and liability. 
 
       Article 43 of the Government Procurement Law insinuates that Contract Law is applicable to gov-
ernment procurement contracts. [FN167] Articles 42 and 43 of the Chinese Contract Law [FN168] do 
provide for some civil liability arising from pre-contractual conduct. Article 42 covers three separate 
grounds, namely negotiation in bad faith, deliberate concealment of important matters or false declaration, 
and other bad faith conduct. Article 43 addresses improper use or disclosure of commercial trade acquired 
during contract negotiation. It is theoretically possible that the general prohibition on bad faith conduct 
under Article 42(3) be interpreted to include violations of the Government Procurement Law and Tem-
porary Measures. Indeed, the common law courts in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.K. have 
extended contractual obligations to the pre-award tender process by government procuring authorities, 
providing aggrieved suppliers with potent and substantial civil compensation claims against government 
procuring authorities. [FN169] Nonetheless, conventional Chinese jurisprudence views such violations as 
administrative violations that give rise to administrative and criminal liabilities but which preclude civil 
claims. [FN170] 
 
       The applicability of the Chinese Contract Law to government procurement under the Government 
Procurement Law is also limited in situations where the contract has been awarded. [FN171] This reflects 
the German approach, which bifurcates the government procurement process into the initial contract se-
lection period (considered administrative in nature and remedied primarily *180 via administrative pro-
cess) and contract performance (considered contractual in nature and remedied by civil litigation based on 
breach of contract). [FN172] In the absence of judicial interpretation by the People's Supreme Court, it is 
unlikely that Article 42 of the Chinese Contract Law will serve as the basis for civil compensation claims 
for procedural violations during the government procurement process. [FN173] 
 
B. Specific Problems Associated with the Temporary Measures 
 
       The inadequacies of the enforcement mechanisms available to aggrieved suppliers under the Gov-
ernment Procurement Law have been highlighted by Chinese academics and commentators. Common 
criticisms include the restrictiveness of the standing requirement, [FN174] the lack of interim remedies 
during the complaint proceedings, [FN175] limited access to information necessary to facilitate effective 
complaint, [FN176] bias of the government procuring authority handling the initial complaint, [FN177] 
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insufficient provision for settlement, [FN178] and incompatibility with the requirements of the WTO 
GPA. [FN179] In addition to these critiques, the specific nature of the preferential treatment of SMEs 
under the Temporary Measures introduces further obstacles to effective enforcement by aggrieved sup-
pliers. 
 
       1. Preferential Treatment 
 
       The Temporary Measures provides concrete and significant preferential treatment for SMEs during 
government procurement.*181 [FN180] The failure of the government procuring authority to accord such 
preferential treatment to a qualifying SME can materially affect the final award of the contract, to the 
detriment of the qualifying SME. However, an SME deprived of this legally-provided benefit does not 
have access to the type of legal recourses typically available for other violations of law in the government 
procurement process. The best bet for an SME wrongly denied preferential treatment is to either terminate 
the improper procurement process or, if the procurement process is complete, seek compensation. As 
discussed above, these remedies are only available if the violations fall under Article 71 and Article 72 of 
the Government Procurement Law. [FN181] 
 
       There is significant overlap between Article 71 and Article 72, both dealing with improper conduct of 
government procuring authorities during the procurement process. The distinction is in the severity of the 
violation: Article 72 covers violations that are capable of constituting criminal offenses, while Article 71 
involves administrative irregularities that are subject to administrative sanctions. [FN182] It is hard to fit 
the failure to grant a discount to qualifying SMEs into the grounds established in those two provisions. 
Provisions of Article 71 seem to apply most to situations involving failure to grant a discount to qualifying 
SMEs. Article 71(2) covers “arbitrarily increas[ing] procurement standard[s],” while Article 71(4) covers 
“discrimination via imposing unreasonable conditions.” Article 71(2) is intended to apply to specifica-
tions for goods and services set out in the procurement documents and primarily targets overspending by 
the government procuring authority. [FN183] The failure to give a discount to a particular supplier is 
unlikely to fall under this Section. Article 71(4) targets an intentionally discriminatory act by the gov-
ernment procuring authority, and it is doubtful whether the provision is immediately capable of being 
extended to a situation involving the more passive decision to not grant a discount. 
 
       The failure to set aside the minimum quota of government procurement specifically reserved for 
SMEs is even harder to enforce. First, the quota may be reduced on account of operational constraints and 
the basic needs of public service, [FN184] providing the government authority with a possible legal de-
fense for not reserving government procurement for SMEs. Second, the standing*182 requirement of 
actual participation in the challenged government procurement [FN185] means that the complainant is 
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faced with the impossible task of establishing that the particular procurement participated in is one that 
should be reserved for SMEs. Finally, the limitations of Article 71(2) and 71(4) in covering the 
non-granting of SME discounts, as discussed above, pose similar challenges here. 
 
       2. Definition of SMEs 
 
       Another enforcement concern relates to the classification of SMEs. An erroneous classification of 
SMEs may harm a supplier in two ways. First, an otherwise qualifying SME is deprived of its entitled 
preferential treatment if it is wrongly classified as a larger enterprise. Second, an enterprise (be it a large 
enterprise [FN186] or SME) is at a comparative disadvantage in the bidding of a contract if its competitors 
enjoy preferential treatment arising from an erroneously designated SME status. The likelihood of the 
former scenario is not particularly high because the Temporary Measures relies primarily on a 
self-declaratory mechanism. [FN187] This is due to the current lack of an authoritative classification body 
in China and the inability of government procuring authorities, which are government organs without 
particular expertise in dealing with SMEs, to determine SME status. [FN188] The self-declaratory 
mechanism, however, is likely to aggravate the later scenario in which competitors falsely declare SME 
status to enjoy preferential treatment. 
 
       The declaration form certifying SME status contains a clause that provides for “legal liability in ac-
cordance with the law” for false declaration. False declaration of information by a supplier during pro-
curement is one ground for a variety of different sanctions, including the payment of fines, forfeiture of 
illegal gains, and being blacklisted, all under Article 77 of the Government Procurement Law. [FN189] 
These are substantial sanctions that arguably can provide effective deterrence against false declaration of 
SME status. The issue at hand is whether this provision will be vigorously enforced when a supplier is not 
effectively deterred. 
 
       An aggrieved supplier can initiate complaint proceedings under the Government Procurement Law 
because the false declaration of a fellow competitor affects the outcome of the procurement*183 process. 
However, issues relating to the categorization of SMEs during the supervision and complaint components 
of government procurement are handled by the relevant local branches of the SME regulatory body. 
[FN190] This creates a lacuna in administrative responsibility. On the one hand, the government pro-
curing authority that handles the initial complaint is not responsible for resolving the issue. On the other 
hand, the SME regulatory body tasked with ascertaining SME status is not subject to the seven-day re-
sponse deadline imposed on the government procuring authority. [FN191] A similar dilemma occurs 
during the administrative appeal process. The Ministry of Finance and its local branches are tasked with 
handling the appeal [FN192] and are subject to a thirty-day deadline. [FN193] This corresponds with the 
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right to suspend the procurement process for a maximum of thirty days during the handling of an appeal. 
[FN194] This time limit and the administrative sanctions for delay [FN195] are not applicable to the SME 
regulatory body. [FN196] 
 
       This lacuna in administrative responsibility means that both the government procuring authority and 
the supervising regulatory authority will not be at fault for the delay in handling the complaint involving 
disputed SME status. Delay is foreseeable given the institutional limitations of the SME regulatory au-
thority. The SME regulatory authority is a specialized department under the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology. [FN197] *184 The mandate of this department is broadly defined and focuses on 
macroeconomic development. [FN198] It is not geared toward resolving certification issues within the 
tight timeline set forth in the Government Procurement Law. [FN199] While the complainant can proceed 
with judicial review if there is no decision after the stipulated timeline, such a right is hollow because the 
subject matter of judicial review is determined by the decision (or inaction) of the supervising authority 
and not the government procurement contract itself. [FN200] With no fault on the part of the supervising 
authority for delay, the likely outcome of judicial review will be to wait for the resolution by the SME 
regulatory authority. In addition, any dispute as to the decision of the SME regulatory authority must be 
appealed separately via administrative review, given the limited scope of judicial review under the Gov-
ernment Procurement Law. [FN201] Such undue delay and additional procedural requirements are cer-
tainly not conducive to enforcement actions. 
 
       3. Prohibition of Sub-contracting 
 
       The prohibition on sub-contracting is an important measure to prevent abuses of the preferential 
treatment meant for SMEs. Given that an enterprise can qualify as an SME even if wholly owned by a 
large entity, there is a real risk that such a subsidiary may sub-contract the government contract back to its 
parent enterprise. In any event, sub-contracting to a large enterprise diminishes*185 the effectiveness of 
the preferential treatment for SMEs. Article 7 of the Temporary Measures purports to tackle this problem 
by prohibiting an SME from sub-contracting government procurement contracts to entities larger than 
itself. This is the right approach. However, the enforcement mechanism for this provision is lacking. 
 
       The key obstacle arises from the fact that illegal sub-contracting, by definition, occurs after the con-
tract has been awarded. The remedies for post-contractual award matters are usually limited to those that 
occur between the contracted party and the government procuring agency. The complaint procedure set 
out in Chapter 6 of the Government Procurement Law concerns violations in relation to the procurement 
process and does not cover violations that occur after the award of the contract. Similarly, there is no 
remedy available under Article 73 because the provisions set out in Articles 71 and 72 only cover viola-
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tions of the procurement process. Unless it could be shown that the SMEs in question intended at the 
outset to subcontract with larger enterprises, [FN202] not even Article 77 would authorize the imposition 
of legal liability for sub-contracting. [FN203] While this distinction reflects the well-established principle 
of the privity of contract, an aggrieved supplier may rightly feel that an SME who subsequently 
sub-contracts to large enterprises should not be entitled to the SME price discount or to participate in 
government procurement reserved for SMEs. The aggrieved supplier is, however, left without recourse 
under the law. 
 
C. Challenge Procedures Under the GPA and Limited Impact on Reform 
 
       In addition to the possible implications for SME preferential policies, [FN204] the GPA's domestic 
review procedures can potentially provide an illustrative benchmark for strengthening the enforcement 
mechanisms of the Chinese Government Procurement Law. Article 18 of the GPA provides for domestic 
review procedures that are significantly broader in scope than those currently in place in China. Much has 
been written by Chinese commentators and academics on the reform opportunities provided by the 
planned accession to the GPA. Liu Lui has argued that reform is necessary to strengthen the complaint 
mechanism and expand coverage to include government construction procurement contracts*186 and the 
issuance of financial instruments. [FN205] A comprehensive analysis by Yang Huihui and Yang Peng has 
identified several areas for reform, including the clarification of the nature of government procurement 
contracts, the reconciliation of discrepancies between the threshold for central and local procurement, etc. 
[FN206] Cao Heping and Zang Jugai and other commentators have also engaged in similar reconciliation 
proposals. [FN207] 
 
       However, even the full adoption of the domestic review procedures set forth in the GPA is unlikely to 
substantially alter the enforcement deficiencies highlighted in this Article. In particular, the inadequacies 
of remedies and the stringent standing requirement will remain, even under the GPA. 
 
       1. Limited Reform of Inadequate Remedies 
 
       The revised version of the GPA has already been criticized for failing to remedy the independence 
requirement of the review body, inadequacies of interim measures, and the narrow grounds for challenge. 
[FN208] In particular, the limited compensatory remedies mandated by the GPA impede effective private 
enforcement. The GPA limits compensation to either the costs for preparation of the tender or the costs 
relating to the challenge. [FN209] Either would be an improvement over the current Chinese regime in 
providing clarity of the monetary compensation available for successful challenge of pre-contractual vi-
olations by the government procuring authority. However, neither is likely to provide an adequate incen-
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tive for suppliers to vigorously challenge violations by the government procuring authority. 
 
       Suppliers are likely to pursue legal action only if the gains flowing from a successful action, multi-
plied by the probability of success, are greater than the costs of the challenge. The time and money re-
quired to bring a challenge from start to finish can be substantial. [FN210] The ability to recoup lost 
profits as monetary compensation is thus arguably necessary to mitigate the high costs of challenge. Such 
monetary compensation is paramount in situations in which the procurement contract has been awarded 
and performed. Remedies of rescission and possibilities of re-award *187 are no longer available in such 
situations. [FN211] Simply put, recovering only the costs of tender or costs of the challenge is not suffi-
cient for aggrieved suppliers. 
 
       Moreover, there are other indirect costs to suppliers that further constrain private enforcement. Suc-
cessful complainants in Canada, for example, can recover lost profits in addition to the costs of proposal 
and tender preparation. [FN212] Recent developments in English common law have also resulted in 
similar generous awards of monetary damages. [FN213] However, the availability of such remedies has 
not necessarily resulted in a flood of cases in Canada [FN214] or in the UK. [FN215] A survey in the UK 
of contractors, legal firms, and authorities found that aside from the probability of success, costs and the 
speed of proceedings remain key factors in a firm's decision to sue. The opportunity for significant 
damage awards is not a motivating factor to aggrieved bidders in the UK. [FN216] Another more signif-
icant constraint is the concern that such suits might jeopardize the chance of future contracts. [FN217] 
Given the domineering influence of the Chinese government on the economy as well as on daily life, such 
concerns are only likely to be exacerbated in China. 
 
       2. Impediment of Standing in Enforcing SME Linkages 
 
       As discussed above, the stringent standing requirement under Chinese law, which requires partici-
pation in the procurement being challenged, is a significant restriction on the enforcement of the Gov-
ernment Procurement Law. [FN218] In addition, this stringent standing requirement is aggravated by the 
particular challenges posed by SME preferential policies, such as the enforcement of preferential treat-
ment and the prohibition of sub-contracting. 
 
       The GPA will provide little reform in this regard. Article 18(1) of the GPA provides that challenge 
procedures need only be applicable to a “supplier” who “has, or has had, an interest.” The lack of a defi-
nition under the GPA as to the meaning of “supplier” and “interest” creates uncertainty as to whether 
potential*188 suppliers who did not actually participate in the government procurement have standing to 
sue. Xinglin Zhang has opined that even a narrow interpretation of the provision would likely still include 
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potential suppliers and that the debate on interpretation is really about the issue of potential 
sub-contractors and other suppliers in the supply chain. [FN219] However, given that the Chinese su-
pervisory and legislative authorities have chosen to exclude potential competitors under the similarly 
ambiguously worded provisions in the Chinese Government Procurement Law, such exclusion is likely to 
be perpetuated in the absence of a specific and non-ambiguous provision under the GPA. 
 
       3. Summary: Limited Impact of the GPA 
 
       Even if China manages to resolve the significant obstacles standing before its accession to the GPA, 
[FN220] the implementation of the GPA is unlikely to be the basis of any dramatic reform of enforcement 
mechanisms under the Government Procurement Law. Remedies remain inadequate to provide sufficient 
incentive for private enforcement and restrictions on standing continue to limit the number of viable 
challenges. 
 
       Moreover, the GPA does not remedy the particular challenges of enforcing SME preferential policies. 
The GPA reforms provide no relief to a qualified SME supplier that is wrongly denied preferential 
treatment (e.g., price discount). Like the lack of legal coverage under Articles 71 and 72 of the Chinese 
Government Procurement Law, failure to grant preferential treatment does not violate the substantive 
rules of the GPA. These include the principle of non-discrimination under Article 4(1), the limitations of 
conditions for participation under Article 7, and the need to award the contract to the most advantageous 
tender under Article 15(5). Similarly, given that the GPA is limited to the procurement process and not 
post-award contractual performance, an aggrieved supplier will continue to lack both legal standing and a 
legal basis to challenge a breach of the sub-contracting prohibition. 
 
       This is not surprising, given that procurement linkages (whether to support SMEs or otherwise) are 
frowned upon by *189 the GPA, which has strived to eliminate discrimination and enhance transparency 
in government procurement. Accordingly, SME procurement linkages must be negotiated as exceptions to 
coverage by acceding members. [FN221] As will be elaborated upon in the next Section and in V.A, a 
point that is often overlooked in the design of procurement linkages is that the issues relating to the en-
forcement of such government procurement are categorically different from conventional government 
procurement. Thus, an enhancement of the enforcement mechanisms for government procurement in 
general will often fail to translate into improved enforcement of these preferential policies. 
 
D. Perverse Incentives of Government Bodies 
 
       Chinese academic critiques of the enforcement of the Government Procurement Law usually focus on 
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the limited availability and procedural obstacles of its challenge mechanisms. [FN222] These are un-
doubtedly important considerations for effective enforcement of any law and regulation. An equally 
important but often overlooked issue, however, is whether the relevant party has the right incentive to 
utilize enforcement mechanisms. The current limitations on private enforcement mechanisms under the 
regulatory regime place increased emphasis on effective public enforcement. This is not always a bad 
thing in the context of government procurement because excessive private enforcement may impose 
undue delay and costs on proper procurement decisions (i.e. losing bidders may initiate complaints simply 
to stall the procurement process and frustrate their competitors). [FN223] However, if public enforcement 
is to take center stage in the enforcement of SME preferential policies, it is paramount that government 
procuring authorities and supervising authorities have the right incentives to carry out this function. Un-
fortunately, this is not the case. 
 
       1. Perverse Incentives of the Government Procuring Authority 
 
       The main institutional incentive of the government procuring authority is to minimize expenditures 
and to maximize the quality of goods. [FN224] In practice, corruption and conflict of interests plague 
government procurement in China. [FN225] Moreover, *190 there is little incentive for the government 
procuring authority to pursue violations and circumventions of the Temporary Measures. Violations of the 
Government Procurement Law by a supplier generally cause real financial loss to the government pro-
curing authority. For example, misrepresentation by the supplier, [FN226] perhaps as to its credentials and 
experience, can negatively affect the quality of goods and services supplied to the government procuring 
authority. Similarly, collusion among competing suppliers [FN227] can artificially drive up the contract 
price to the detriment of the government procuring authority. However, the situation is reversed in the 
particular context of SME preferential treatment under the Temporary Measures. 
 
       The Temporary Measures was enacted to mitigate the difficulties faced by SMEs in government 
procurement. A particular problem is the preference of the government procuring authority for large en-
terprises and the prejudice against the perceived unreliability and technical deficiencies of SMEs. [FN228] 
Such bias against SMEs is not entirely unfounded. SMEs do face constraints in size, capabilities, econ-
omies of scale, and factors that may either affect the quality of their output or increase the risk of breach. 
[FN229] Of course, large enterprises are not entirely immune from sub-standard work. Indeed, some of 
the widely reported public infrastructure accidents in the Chinese press can be attributed in part to the 
sub-standard work of large enterprises. [FN230] However, such reports may actually strengthen the in-
centive of the government procuring authority to prefer large enterprises. The blame for the incidents is 
likely to be shared by the large enterprises and not simply attributed to the government procuring authority 
that awarded the contract. In the absence of corruption, the government procuring authority is at best 
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gullible for trusting the established name of a large enterprise. One can envisage a very different attribu-
tion of blame if the government procuring authority had awarded the contract to an SME whose perfor-
mance was found to be inadequate. In the latter scenario, *191 the government procuring authority would 
likely be perceived as risking public safety by selecting small enterprises that lack the experience, ex-
pertise, and reputation of established enterprises. 
 
       Taken together, the government procuring authority has a strong incentive to prefer goods and ser-
vices from an established, large enterprise. This places the government procuring authority in a position of 
conflicting interests with respect to violations of the Temporary Measures. As discussed above, the 
common violations and circumvention of the Temporary Measures typically involve large enterprises 
attempting to usurp the preferential treatment meant for SMEs. [FN231] This can be achieved through 
existing legal loopholes such as the establishment of wholly owned subsidiaries that individually satisfy 
SME requisites. This can also be achieved through other illegal means such as false declarations of SME 
status and improper investment relationships between suppliers constituting a consortium bid. SMEs that 
win a contract may also sub-contract it to a large enterprise. The government procuring authority is not, in 
relation to its interests, in a position to police such legal circumventions. The government procuring au-
thority will also not be vigorous in policing false declarations of SME status and other violations of the 
Temporary Measures because such violations result in the preferred outcome for the government pro-
curing authority - receiving goods and services from an established large enterprise. 
 
       The effect of a perverse incentive is particularly salient in the prohibition of sub-contracting to large 
enterprises. As discussed above, fellow competitors lack standing to challenge improper sub-contracting 
because these are post-award matters between the government procurement authority and the contracted 
supplier. [FN232] Competitors also lack information at this point because they are no longer included in 
the procurement process. This renders the government procurement authority the primary enforcer of 
improper sub-contracting. This is usually not a severe problem. Most situations of improper 
sub-contracting involve sub-contractors providing goods and services of inferior quality. Notwithstanding 
the significant presence of corruption, in which the government procurement authority turns a blind eye 
toward post-contractual substitution of inferior goods and services, [FN233] the government procurement 
authority is still theoretically*192 well-placed to monitor and enforce any such violations. However, when 
the improper sub-contracting involves sub-contracting to large enterprises or the contracted SMEs supply 
goods and services from large enterprises, [FN234] the government procurement authority suffers no 
financial loss and might even benefit financially. This can result in indifference or even implicit approval 
by the government authority of such violations. 
 
       Acquiescing in violations brings other benefits to the government procuring authority as well. Article 
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12 of the Temporary Measures mandates that government departments prepare annual reports on the 
amount of SME participation in government procurement. These annual reports are submitted to relevant 
Ministry of Finance departments and are subject to public disclosure. By ignoring violations such as false 
declarations of SME status and improper investment relationships in consortium bids, the statistics for 
SME participation in government procurement are in fact artificially inflated and allow the government 
procuring authority to meet the political expectation of complying with preferential treatments policies for 
SMEs. 
 
       2. Distracted Supervisory Authority 
 
       At the frontline of public enforcement, the government procuring authority is in the best position to 
detect improper and illegal conduct by suppliers. As discussed in the preceding Section, the perverse 
incentives of the government procuring authority pose serious obstacles to the effective enforcement of 
the Temporary Measures. That being said, the supervising regulatory authority can help to offset some of 
these obstacles. The supervising regulatory authority is an integral component of the public enforcement 
of government procurement, [FN235] particularly because the government procuring authority is fre-
quently the primary perpetuator of illegal conduct. Unfortunately, however, compliance with the Tem-
porary Measures is unlikely to be an important priority of the supervisory regulatory authority. 
 
       The Ministry of Finance is the responsible supervisory regulatory authority tasked with ensuring 
proper conduct in government procurement. [FN236] Its areas of supervision are broad and varied. As set 
out in a 2009 policy directive by the State Council, the Ministry of Finance and its relevant local branches 
are responsible for ensuring that the proper mode and conduct of procurement*193 is utilized, [FN237] 
setting out concrete standards and procedural requirements for the documentation and procedures relevant 
to government procurement, [FN238] enhancing the monitoring of contract valuation and contract 
awarding to improve budget control and procurement effectiveness, [FN239] supervising the implemen-
tation of socio-economic policies in government procurement, [FN240] vigorously enforcing violations, 
[FN241] promoting information technology in government procurement, [FN242] and assisting in the 
improvement of the qualifications and professionalism of procuring personnel. [FN243] Enforcement of 
SME procurement linkages is, at best, just one of many responsibilities imposed on the Ministry of Fi-
nance, and one that may be neglected from time to time. 
 
       Moreover, SME procurement linkages are dwarfed by the dominant concern of financial and budg-
etary issues in government procurement. For example, in a 2012 policy directive by a municipal gov-
ernment on the topic of strengthening supervision of government procurement, the Finance Department 
was tasked with ensuring proper budgeting, accounting, procedure monitoring, and other finance-related 
30 UCLAPBLJ 149 Page 33 
30 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 149 
© 2013 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
matters. While the Finance Department was also tasked with supervising the use of government pro-
curement to advance macro-economic policy goals, this function was more of an afterthought compared to 
the Department's other roles. [FN244] Indeed, in the 2009 policy directives by the State Council, the 
predominant problem identified was the loss of public funds through corruption and other government 
contracts that are inefficient and overpriced. [FN245] This focus is unsurprising because it reflects the 
prevailing views of academics and the public on the fiscal aspects of government procurement. [FN246] 
The relative ease of quantifying this aspect of government procurement also facilitates empirical studies 
that further serve as a benchmark for *194 evaluating the effectiveness of the Chinese government pro-
curement regime. [FN247] However, this also increases the likelihood that the supervising regulatory 
authority will overlook enforcement of less salient and measurable socio-economic policies, such as the 
Temporary Measures. [FN248] 
 
V. THOUGHTS ON REFORM 
 
A. Peculiarity of SME Linkages in Government Procurement Reform 
 
       The discussion above in Part IV highlights an often overlooked aspect of the design of SME pro-
curement linkages - the system of enforcement for these preferential policies is categorically different 
from that of conventional government procurement. The common practice is to treat procurement linkages 
like any other type of government procurement and apply the standard enforcement mechanisms for 
government procurement in general. In China, the Temporary Measures simply imports the standard 
enforcement mechanisms built into the Government Procurement Law. A similar approach is also adopted 
for other procurement linkages. For example, the now repealed [FN249] government procurement poli-
cies to support indigenous innovation similarly referred to the complaint mechanisms under the Gov-
ernment Procurement Law. [FN250] 
 
       The problem with this common approach is that the particular challenges of enforcing procurement 
linkages are not addressed in the design of enforcement mechanisms for general government procurement. 
The challenges are threefold. First, procurement linkages often require additional determinations to *195 
gauge the scope of qualified suppliers entitled to preferential treatment. This determination often requires 
the expertise of a specialized agency (i.e. not the general procurement entity). Unfortunately, the proce-
dural requirements that apply to general government procurement are not applied to special agencies, 
leading to a lacuna in administrative and legal responsibility that impedes effective enforcement. This 
problem is manifested in challenges in enforcing the definition of SMEs under the Temporary Measures, 
which delegates the SME definition to the specialized SME regulatory authority but does not impose any 
particular procedural requirements or timelines on the SME regulatory authority. [FN251] 
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       Second, violations of SME preferential policies are often not automatically covered by the substantive 
legal obligations applicable to general government procurement. As discussed above, the existing grounds 
for challenges under Articles 71 and 72 of the Chinese Government Procurement Law do not cover the 
failure by the procuring entity to provide preferential treatment to qualified SMEs. Such violations are 
similarly omitted from the substantive rules under the GPA. This is not surprising because the very act of 
granting preferential treatment to certain suppliers is antithetical to the general principles of 
non-discrimination and “best value for money” that form the basic foundation of laws governing gov-
ernment procurement. Whether this departure is desirable is the subject of intense debate. As to SME 
preferential policy, John Linarelli has made a limited case in support of SME procurement linkages on the 
ground that this may actually improve competition while promoting justice and other non-economic 
values. [FN252] Richard J. Pierce, Jr., on the other hand, is skeptical of the justifications for government 
preferences for small firms, noting that small firms do not in fact account for a disproportionate share of 
net job growth (total jobs created minus jobs lost; small firms tend to fail at a higher rate) and contribute 
disproportionately in terms of social harms such as occupational injuries, pollution, etc. [FN253] In any 
event, if the policy decision is to move ahead with an SME support program involving preferential 
treatment in government procurement, then it must be recognized that what is involved is not simply an 
exercise in conventional government procurement but an exercise that entails a substantial reevaluation of 
the current enforcement mechanisms. 
 
        *196 Third, the need for overhaul in enforcement is aggravated by the specific nature of procurement 
linkages, which give rise to perverse incentives among the government procuring authorities and super-
visory authority to overlook violations. As noted above, violations of the Temporary Measures typically 
do not cause financial loss to the government procuring authority. In fact, the government procuring au-
thority may secretly prefer violations. This should be unsurprising as the whole purpose of instituting 
procurement linkages is that the government procuring authority, under normal circumstances, prefers 
other suppliers, resulting in the need to mandate preferential treatment to tilt the scale in favor of the 
targeted suppliers. However, this insight is not carried through to the enforcement mechanisms built 
around the government procuring authority and the supervisory authority. If government authorities are 
indeed indifferent towards violations of procurement linkages, they cannot be relied on to vigorously 
enforce the procurement linkages. 
 
       In sum, a critical examination of China's SME procurement linkages raises a general point on how 
policy makers should approach preferential policies in government procurement. The key conclusion is 
that procurement linkages are not part of conventional government procurement and should not be con-
ceived of as such. In particular, effective enforcement mechanisms for these procurement linkages require 
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reforms beyond strengthening existing enforcement mechanisms for government procurement. It is im-
portant to ensure a targeted inquiry into enforcement issues relating to specific preferential policies, par-
ticularly the incentives of enforcers who are expected to ensure compliance. In this regard, the next Sec-
tion will proffer two suggestions as to possible approaches for enhancing enforcement of the Temporary 
Measures. 
 
B. Suggestions for Reforms 
 
       In light of the enforcement problems identified above, this Section offers two possible approaches for 
reform. First, private enforcement can be strengthened with special enforcement mechanisms that apply 
only to procurement linkages. Second, a dedicated public enforcement body, whether a dedicated gov-
ernment organ or a government-sanctioned non-profit organization, can be established to create the right 
incentives in public enforcement. 
 
       1. Special Enforcement Mechanisms for SME Linkages 
 
       To ensure adequate private enforcement of the Temporary Measures, special enforcement mecha-
nisms should be designed *197 for aggrieved competitors. This would involve changes to both substantive 
and procedural rules. 
 
       Reform of substantive rules is necessary to remedy the lacuna under the current stipulated grounds for 
challenges, which omit the failure to grant preferential treatment. This can be achieved in two ways. First, 
Articles 72 and 73 of the Government Procurement Law, which set forth the grounds for challenges, could 
be amended to include the failure to grant preferential treatment under any regulations that provide for 
procurement linkages. Second, the Temporary Measures could be amended to incorporate a special 
challenge mechanism for failure to grant preferential treatment to qualified SMEs. 
 
       The advantage of the former method is that the effect is not simply limited to SME preferential pol-
icies under the Temporary Measures. Given that procurement linkages are typically administrative regu-
lations enacted pursuant to or with reference to the Government Procurement Law, amending the Gov-
ernment Procurement Law will resolve the enforcement difficulties of other Chinese procurement link-
ages, both present and future. However, this wide-ranging effect will inevitably increase political re-
sistance to the amendment, especially given that the merits of procurement linkages remain unsettled in 
both domestic and international circles. 
 
       In this regard, the piecemeal approach under the latter method may be more politically feasible, with 
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implications restricted to SME procurement linkages. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this method 
would require the Temporary Measures to not only to stipulate that the failure to grant preferential 
treatment is ground for challenge, but also to establish a new independent challenge mechanism. If the 
Temporary Measures continues to import the challenges mechanisms under the Government Procurement 
Law, the grounds for challenges will remain limited by Articles 72 and 73 of the Government Procure-
ment Law. As an administrative regulation, the Temporary Measures cannot override the Government 
Procurement Law enacted by the National People's Congress. [FN254] 
 
       In any event, another amendment to the procedures is also necessary to synchronize the current dis-
connect between the procedural requirement for decision making within a stipulated timeframe and the 
actual decision maker. The SME regulatory body tasked with adjudicating the issue of SME qualifications 
should be subject to the same procedural requirements as the relevant*198 government authority that is 
processing the complaint. This can be achieved by either a general amendment to the Government Pro-
curement Law or by specific changes to the Temporary Measures. 
 
       2. Dedicated Public Enforcement Agencies 
 
       The strengthening of private enforcement mechanisms should be coupled with measures to mitigate 
the perverse incentives of the government procuring authority and the supervisory authority. This requires 
the creation of a public enforcement agency dedicated to enforcing procurement linkages. This new public 
enforcement agency could serve as the single resource for complaints by aggrieved suppliers and serve to 
initiate investigations and enforcement proceedings upon receipt of complaints. In addition, an important 
task of this public enforcement agency would be to regularly follow up on the performance of contracts 
that involve preferential treatments specified by the Temporary Measures. Such post-award violations 
remain ill-suited for private enforcement, even with amendments to procedural and substantive laws, 
given the practical problem of lack of information by other suppliers and the normative concern about 
undue disruption to the privity of contract. 
 
       There are two possible ways to set up this new public enforcement agency. First, the public en-
forcement agency could be a government body. This could be a specific government procurement en-
forcement branch set up within the current SME regulatory authority or a newly created department tasked 
to monitor and enforce preferential policies in government procurement. In either case, it will be imper-
ative to clearly define the mandate of this government agency to focus primarily on ensuring that the 
preferential policies reach their intended targets. In particular, the mandate should exclude any general 
supervision of the government procurement process to avoid unnecessary distraction, especially because 
financial losses in government procurement are usually more politically salient than the failure to grant 
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preferential policies. 
 
       Alternatively, a government-sanctioned non-profit organization could be formed. China has already 
adopted a state-sponsored non-profit organization in the realm of consumer protection. [FN255] This 
consumer protection organization is tasked with investigating and mediating consumer complaints. 
[FN256] It also *199 supports consumers in initiating legal action against consumer rights infringement. 
[FN257] A similar non-profit organization could be created to aggressively monitor compliance with the 
Temporary Measures and to assist aggrieved suppliers in pursuing remedies for violations of the Tem-
porary Measures. 
 
       Creating either of the two public enforcement agencies would inevitably result in an increase in 
regulatory costs and bureaucracy that might seem disproportionate to the enforcement of the Temporary 
Measures and/or other procurement linkages. Nonetheless, 30% of government procurement is to be re-
served for SME support purposes under the Temporary Measures, in addition to price discounts for other 
procurement. [FN258] This easily involves a commitment of government procurement well in excess of 
200 billion RMB. [FN259] Having made the decision to initiate SME procurement linkages, the sheer 
scale and economic significance of the Temporary Measures warrant the additional regulatory costs to 
ensure effective enforcement and compliance. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AND PROCUREMENT LINK-
AGES 
 
       Two important takeaways emerge from this Article's critical examination of the Temporary Measures 
and the corresponding reform proposals. First, preferential policies in government procurement are dif-
ferent from conventional government procurement. The inadequacies in private enforcement, even under 
the GPA challenge procedures, reflect the different principles underlying procurement linkages and 
conventional government procurement. The perverse incentives of the procuring authority and supervi-
sory authority to overlook circumventions and other violations of the Temporary Measures pose particular 
challenges in the design and reliance of public enforcement mechanisms. This disconnect between pro-
curement linkages and the legal rules designed for conventional government procurement means that 
effective enforcement of these procurement linkages requires specific legislative attention to create pri-
vate and public enforcement mechanisms that are tailored to the specific needs of these preferential pol-
icies. 
 
       The second takeaway relates to law reform in China. The lacunas in the definition of SMEs and re-
lated enforcement mechanisms will likely thwart effective implementation of the Temporary*200 
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Measures. There is little being done to stop large enterprises from usurping the preferential treatment of 
SMEs via the use of wholly owned subsidiaries or other related corporate entities. However, notwith-
standing the obvious reform solution in light of the various established practices of other jurisdictions, 
close examination of the legislative background and socio-political circumstances reveals that the lacunas 
in the SME definition and enforcement mechanisms are not oversights. The loopholes in the definition are 
unlikely to be closed if local governments continue their dominance of local economies. 
 
       These insights highlight the need for a different understanding of the legislative process and legal 
reform in China. Unlike in the early days of reform, [FN260] legal expertise and regulatory sophistication 
is no longer in short supply in China. [FN261] Comparative perspectives from other jurisdictions are also 
commonly incorporated into the legislative drafting process. [FN262] Thus, any conspicuous deficiencies 
in the legal or regulatory regime are more likely to be the result of conscious decisionmaking. These could 
be relatively innocuous, such as the tension between industry-specific and uniform approaches to defining 
SMEs driving China's oscillation. They could also be more intentional, such as the surreptitious disregard 
of circumvention by related enterprises in SME preferential policies. Unraveling these often non-apparent 
influences shaping the legislative process will be essential in the study of law and legal reform in China. 
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[FN134]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 12. Even the elaboration under the 
proposed implementation regulations merely focuses on conflict of interest between the individuals of 
government procuring authority and the supplier without restricting investment relationship between the 
government procuring authority and the supplier. Zhengfu Caigou Fa Shishi Tielie (Zhengqiu Yijian Gao) 
[Implementation Regulations of Government Procurement Law (Opinion Soliciting Draft)] (promulgated 
by St. Council, Jan. 11, 2010) (P.R.C) Article 13. 
 
[FN135]. Xu, supra note 133. 
 
[FN136]. Notice on the Categorization of Medium-Small Enterprises, supra note 68. 
 
[FN137]. Ma & Jiang, supra note 48, at 81-82; Aaditya Mattoo, The Government Procurement Agreement: 
Implications of Economic Theory, World Econ. 695, 711 (1996) (this is especially so when compared to 
the dispersed taxpayers who have little interest and incentive to monitor individual procurement decision). 
 
[FN138]. Daniel I. Gordon, Constructing a Bid Protest Process: The Choices that Every Procurement 
Challenge System Must Make, 35 Pub. Cont. L.J. 427, 429-30 (2006). 
 
[FN139]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 52. 
 
[FN140]. Id. at Article 53. 
 
[FN141]. Id. at Article 55. 
 
[FN142]. Id. at Article 13. 
 
[FN143]. Id. at Article 56. 
 
[FN144]. Id. at Article 58. The main difference between administrative review and administrative litiga-
tion is the adjudicating instiution and the grounds for review. Unlike in administrative litigation, where the 
courts are reviewing only the legality of the administrative action, administrative review involves a re-
viewing body that reviews both the legality and the merits/reasonableness of the administrative actions 
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being challenged: see Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal System of the People's Republic of China 
293-304 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2011) 
 
[FN145]. Cao Heping & Zang Jugai, Qianyi Zhongguo Zhengfu Caigou Guize Yu Gouji Xiangguan 
Guize Zhi Duijie [Discussing the Harmonization of China Government Procurement Rules and Relevant 
International Rules], Xue Hai 135, 137 (2011); Liu, supra note 39, at 26-27. 
 
[FN146]. An example of a discriminative bid requirement is where the procurement is restricted to 
products of particular brands/trademark or origin that has no legitimate relation to procurement needs. 
 
[FN147]. The requirement that the supplier must have its “rights and interests harmed” can arguably in-
clude suppliers who did not actually participate (and henceforth did not incur expenses) in the government 
procurement due to discriminatory tender documents or other violations of the Government Procurement 
Law. 
 
[FN148]. The writings from the legal department of the Ministry of Finance indicates that only suppliers 
who actually participated in the government procurement or at least purchased the procurement docu-
ments are entitled to initiate administrative review. Liu Yuantao & Xie Yao, Zhengfu Caigou Xingzheng 
Fuyi Anjian Xiangguan Falv Wenti Yanjiu [Legal Research on Relevant Problems in Government Pro-
curement Administrative Review], China Fin. Times, Dec. 1, 2011, at 4. 
 
[FN149]. Implementation Regulations of Government Procurement Law (Opinion Soliciting Draft), supra 
note 131, at Article 66 (requires direct participation of the government procurement which is being 
challenged). The implementation of this regulation is reportedly delayed due to disputes over regulatory 
jurisdictions between the different government departments and ministries. Lin Yongfu, She Duofang 
Liyi Dalu Caigou Tiaolie Nanchan [China Procurement Regulations Delayed Due to Various Vested In-
terest], Want Daily, Nov. 24, 2011, at A7. 
 
[FN150]. Cao & Zang, supra note 145, at 137; Wang Meili, Zhengfu Caigou Anjian De Falv Shiyong 
[Applicable Law in Government Procurement Cases], 2011(21) People's Judiciary 102, 103 (2011). 
 
[FN151]. Liu, supra note 39, at 26-27; Wang, supra note 9, at 699. 
 
[FN152]. Wang, supra note 150, at 103. 
 
[FN153]. Id. at 106-07; Cao & Zang, supra note 145, at 137-38. 
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[FN154]. Zhou Lijie, Zhengfu Caigou Xingzheng Fuyi Anjian 7 Nian Yu 200 Jian [200 Cases of Gov-
ernment Procurement Administrative Review in 7 Years], China Fin. Times, June 29, 2011, at 1 (In terms 
of success rate, 57 of the 62 cases were actually heard, with decisions upheld in 33 cases (or 58%), cases 
settled and/or discontinued in 20 (or 35%), and only 4 resulted in success (7%)). 
 
[FN155]. Wang, supra note 150, at 105; Yao Wensheng, Zhengfu Caigou Falv Zhidu Yanjiu [Research on 
the Legal System of Government Procurement] 283 (L. Press 2009). 
 
[FN156]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Art. 71-83. 
 
[FN157]. E.g., Id. at art. 72. 
 
[FN158]. Id. at art. 76. 
 
[FN159]. While Article 79 is applicable to supplier as well as the government procuring authority, it is a 
general provision setting out civil liability. 
 
[FN160]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at art. 73(1). 
 
[FN161]. Id. at art. 73(2). In accordance with the express wording of Article 73(1) and Article 73(2), the 
aggrieved supplier is ironically better off if the procurement process has concluded but the contract has not 
been performed. If the procurement process has not concluded, the only outcome of a successful com-
plaint is the termination of that procurement process. There is no requirement that the government pro-
curing authority recommence the procurement process. On the other hand, if the procurement process is 
concluded but the contract has not been performed, the aggrieved supplier will at least get a chance to be 
selected when the contract is re-awarded to other qualifying suppliers who have participated in the pro-
curement process. This peculiar outcome penalizes the aggrieved supplier for initiating an early and 
timely complaint. The official legislative explanation of Article 73 supports this peculiar outcome by 
envisaging that the government procurement process “can” re-initiate in accordance with the needs of 
government procurement. Wang Bing et al., Zhonghua Renmin Gonghe Guo Zhengfu Caigou Fa Shiyi 
[Explanation of People's Republic of China Government Procurement Law] 268-69 (Zhu Shaoping ed., 
China Price Publ'g 2002). This suggests that the recommencement of the government procurement is not 
mandatory. On the hand, the interpretation by the supervising regulatory authority responsible for han-
dling the administrative appeal (i.e. the Ministry of Finance) avoids this peculiar outcome by requiring 
recommencement upon termination of the improper government procurement. Zhengfu Caigou Gongying 
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Shang Tousu Chuli Banfa [Measures for Handling the Complaints of Government Procurement Suppliers] 
(promulgated by Ministry of Finance, Aug. 11, 2004, effective Sep. 11, 2004) (P.R.C.) Article 18 & 19. 
However, this regulation is arguably inconsistent with the Government Procurement Law, insomuch as it 
mandates recommencement even if the government procurement process has been concluded with the 
contract not performed upon. 
 
[FN162]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 73(3) & 79. 
 
[FN163]. Infra IV.B. 
 
[FN164]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 79. Article 77 only concerns violation by 
the supplier, and is generally not applicable when a supplier complains about violations by the govern-
ment procuring authority. 
 
[FN165]. Id. at Article 79. 
 
[FN166]. Contractual and tortious liabilities are the two forms of civil liability envisaged under article 79. 
See Wang Bing et al., supra note 161, at 268-69. 
 
[FN167]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 43. 
 
[FN168]. Hetong Fa [Contract Law] (promulgated by Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 
1999) (P.R.C.). 
 
[FN169]. See Ben A. De Rubeis, Public Procurement in Canada - A Comparative View of Remedies and 
the Tendering Contract, 2011 J. Can. C. Constr. L. 307, 319-26 & 330-35 (2011) (discussing the relevant 
cases in these jurisdictions); Fiona Banks & Michael Bowsher QC, Damages Remedy in England & Wales 
and Northern Ireland, in Public Procurement Law: Damages as an Effective Remedy 61, 64 (Duncan 
Fairgrieve & Francois Lichere eds., Hart 2011). 
 
[FN170]. Wu Hongyu, Zhengfu Caigou Hetong Gexin De Xingzheng Fa Guancha [[Innovating Gov-
ernment Procurement Contract from the Perspective of Administrative Law], 2011(5) Yunnan Admin. 
Faculty J. 99, 100 (2011); Wang, supra note 150, at 105 (there remains divergence in views over the nature 
of government procurement contract); Yao, supra note 155, at 281-83 (noting but disagreeing with the 
argument). 
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[FN171]. Wu, supra note 170, at 102; Wang, supra note 150, at 102. See also Wang et al., supra note 161, 
at 301 (official legislative explanation of the draft). 
 
[FN172]. Wu, supra note 170, at 102; Wang, supra note 150, at 102. 
 
[FN173]. Yao Wensheng is optimistic that pre-contractual liability under Chinese Contract Law could be 
effectively extended to cover government procurement. However, the successful litigation Yao refers to 
involved an egregious refusal by the government procuring authority to sign a contract after the contract 
had been awarded via tender. The conduct would have fallen under Article 42(1) and would in any case 
represent only a minor expansion on prohibited bad faith conduct. See Yao, supra note 155, at 282-83. C.f. 
Yang Huihui & Yang Peng, Zhongguo Zhengfu Caigou Falv Fagui Yu GPA Duibi Fenxi [[Comparative 
Analysis of GPA and China Government Procurement Laws and Regulations], China Gov't Procurement 
52, 57 (2011) (noting that the government authority has other public law obligations in the government 
procurement process that are not included under the umrella of contractual principles). 
 
[FN174]. Liu, supra note 39, at 26-27; Cao & Zang, supra note 145, at 137. 
 
[FN175]. Cao & Zang, supra note 145, at 138. 
 
[FN176]. Yao, supra note 155, at 173. 
 
[FN177]. Liu, supra note 39, at 26-27; Wang, supra note 9, at 699. 
 
[FN178]. Wang, supra note 150, at 107. 
 
[FN179]. Liu, supra note 39, at 25-29; Yang & Yang, supra note 173, at 52; Cao & Zang, supra note 145, 
at 135. 
 
[FN180]. Supra II.C. 
 
[FN181]. Supra IV.B. 
 
[FN182]. For example, “bad faith colluding with a supplier and/or procuring agency” under article 72(1) is 
arguably a more severe form of “holding consultation or negotiation with bidders during the tender pro-
cess under Article 71(5). 
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[FN183]. Wang et al., supra note 161, at 263. 
 
[FN184]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 4. 
 
[FN185]. Supra IV.A.1. 
 
[FN186]. A large enterprise suffers (unfairly) if it loses out to another large enterprise that managed to win 
the bid with the help of an SME discount (obtained via masquerading as an SME). 
 
[FN187]. Temporary Measures, supra note 2, at Article 5. 
 
[FN188]. Press Conference on Temporary Measures, supra note 73. 
 
[FN189]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 77(1). 
 
[FN190]. Temporary Measures, supra note 2, at Article 15. 
 
[FN191]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 53. 
 
[FN192]. Id. at Article 13. 
 
[FN193]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 56; Measures for Handling the Com-
plaints of Government Procurement Suppliers, supra note 161, at Article 20. 
 
[FN194]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 57; Measures for Handling the Com-
plaints of Government Procurement Suppliers, supra note 161, at Article 22. 
 
[FN195]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 81; Measures for Handling the Com-
plaints of Government Procurement Suppliers, supra note 161, at Article 22. 
 
[FN196]. Article 13 of the Government Procurement Law stipulates that the “various branches of Peoples' 
Government and other relevant departments should fulfill their relevant supervisory and management 
duties in accordance with the law.” However, the timeline of seven days (Article 53) and thirty days 
(Article 56) are applicable only to the government procuring authority and the supervisory authority, 
respectively. On a practical note, it seems reasonable for the time limit to begin after the SME regulatory 
authority actually receives the request for certification. Since this is likely to be a later date than the actual 
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complaint or appeal, a timing inconsistency has arisen that was neither envisaged nor dealt with under the 
current Government Procurement Law. 
 
[FN197]. The Temporary Measures only refers to “regulatory authority in charge of SMEs” without 
specifying the particular regulatory authority. Temporary Measures, supra note 2, at Article 15. However, 
the specialized SMEs department of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is likely to be 
the SME regulatory authority referred to under the Temporary Measures given that the Temporary 
Measures is jointly promulgated and interpreted by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. 
The other possible candidate, the State Administration for Industry & Commerce, can be ruled out. While 
the State Administration for Industry & Commerce is responsible for enterprise registration, it has no 
specialized department on SMEs. Organization Structure, State Administration for Industry & Commerce 
of the People's Republic of China, http://www.saic.gov.cn/zzjg/jgsz/ (last visited, June 1, 2012). It is also 
unlikely that regulatory responsibility is imposed on the State Administration for Industry & Commerce 
without its input. 
 
[FN198]. Gongye He Xinxi Hua Bu Zhuyao Zhize Neishe Jigou He Renyuan Bianzhi Guiding [Regula-
tions on the Major Institutional and Personal Organization of the Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology] (promulgated by Ministry of Indus. and Info. Tech., July 11, 2008, effective July 11, 2008) 
(P.R.C.) Article 3(8). 
 
[FN199]. Indeed, there is a conspicuous absence of any mention of the Temporary Measures on its up-
dated website even five months after the effective date of the temporary measures. Small and Mid-Sized 
Enterprises, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic of China, http:// 
qys.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11295074/index.html (last visited Mar., 2013). 
 
[FN200]. Supra IV.A.1. 
 
[FN201]. Since the subject matter of review is the decision of the supervisory authority, and since the 
government procuring authority is to defer to the decision of the SME regulatory authority on the issue of 
SME certification, the decision of the supervisory authority cannot be impugned even if the issue of SME 
certification was wrongly decided. 
 
[FN202]. Article 77(1) of the Government Procurement Law (“provision of false information to win bid”) 
will arguably cover the circumstances where there is such pre-mediated intention and/or pre-bid ar-
rangement to illegally subcontract. 
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[FN203]. Gordon, supra note 138, at 429-30. 
 
[FN204]. Supra II.B.1. 
 
[FN205]. Liu, supra note 39, at 25-29. 
 
[FN206]. Yang & Yang, supra note 173, at 52. 
 
[FN207]. Cao & Zang, supra note 145, at 135; Zhao, supra note 48, at 90, 93-94; Tong, supra note 39, at 
139. 
 
[FN208]. Arie Reich, The New Text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An Analysis and 
Assessment, 12 J. Int'l Econ. L. 989, 1015-17 (2009). 
 
[FN209]. Marrakesh The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf. 
 
[FN210]. Mattoo, supra note 137, at 713. 
 
[FN211]. Supra IV.A.2. 
 
[FN212]. De Rubeis, supra note 169, at 325-28. 
 
[FN213]. Id. at 332-35. 
 
[FN214]. Id. at 329-30 (The Canadian International Trade Tribunal, the institution to which Canadian 
bidders bring complaints, only received, on average, 75 complaints a year, out of thousands of solicita-
tions within its scope. Fifty percent of the complaints are accepted for inquiry, of which 30% to 40% are 
decided in favor of the complainant). 
 
[FN215]. Id. at 348. 
 
[FN216]. Id. at 348. 
 
[FN217]. Id. at 331. 
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[FN218]. Supra IV.A. 
 
[FN219]. Xinglin Zhang, Constructing a System of Challenges Procedures to Comply with the Agreement 
on Government Procurement, in The WTO Regime on Gov't Procurement: Challenge and Reform 483, 
491 (Sue Arrowsmith & Robert D. Anderson eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
 
[FN220]. The major issue concerns the scope of the GPA, namely whether non-central government 
agencies and numerous state-owned enterprises are subjected to the GPA. This reflects the core interests 
of China but is also unsurprisingly resisted by current signatories. Chao, supra note 9, at A11; Mathieson, 
supra note 9, at 240; Wang, supra note 9, at 667-68; Boumil, supra note 29, at 775-76. 
 
[FN221]. Supra II.B.2. 
 
[FN222]. Supra notes 151-56 and accompany text. 
 
[FN223]. Gordon, supra note 138, at 431; Christopher F. Corr & Kristina Zissis, Convergence and Op-
portunity: The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and U.S. Procurement Reform, 18 N.Y.L. Sch. 
J. Int'l & Comp. L. 303, 312 (1999); Mattoo, supra note 137, at 713. 
 
[FN224]. Ma & Jiang, supra note 48, at 81-82; Ma, supra note 39, at 69. 
 
[FN225]. Wang & Zhang, supra note 8; Qu, supra note 8. 
 
[FN226]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 77(1). 
 
[FN227]. Id. at Article 77(3). 
 
[FN228]. Yu, supra note 18, at 181. 
 
[FN229]. He & He, supra note 10, at 43-48 (discussing the statistics that reveal a lower standard of edu-
cation, expertise, research expenditure, and other measures of human capital and viability among the 
SMEs). Poor corporate governance is a common problem afflicting SMEs. Wang, supra note 20, at 143. 
Bad faith business practices is also not uncommon in SMEs. 2011 Survey and Research Report on China 
SMEs, supra note 19, at 12; Zhang, supra note 20, at 65. From an economic perspective, the reputation 
constraints of small firms are also weaker when compared to large enterprises. John Kay et al., Regulatory 
Reform in Britain, Econ. Pol'y 285, 321-22 (1988). 
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[FN230]. E.g., Qu, supra note 8 (the suppliers for the 2011 Wenzhou high speed train disaster are all listed 
companies). 
 
[FN231]. Supra III.C. 
 
[FN232]. Supra IV.B.3. 
 
[FN233]. Qu, supra note 8. Post-award inspection of contractual performance is also a weak link under the 
current regime that neglects the importance of such inspection. Yang Wenli & Tong Shuzhan, Zhengfu 
Caigou Buneng Zhong Caigou Qing Yanshou [Government Procurement Must Not Neglect Post-Contract 
Inspection ], China Collective Econ. 54 (2012). 
 
[FN234]. In violation of Article 2, Temporary Measures, supra note 2. 
 
[FN235]. Public enforcement via administrative supervision by the supervising regulatory authority is the 
primary form of enforcement envisaged by the Temporary Measures: see [original] notes 134-36 and 
accompany text. 
 
[FN236]. Government Procurement Law, supra note 7, at Article 13. 
 
[FN237]. Guanyu Jingyi Bu Jiaqiang Zhengfu Caigou Guanli Gongzhou De Yijian [[Opinions on Further 
Strengthening the Management of Government Procurement] (promulgated by St. Council, Apr. 10, 2009, 
effective Apr. 10, 2009) (P.R.C.) Article 1. 
 
[FN238]. Id. at Article 2. 
 
[FN239]. Id. at Article 3. 
 
[FN240]. Id. at Article 4. 
 
[FN241]. Id. at Article 5. 
 
[FN242]. Id. at Article 6. 
 
[FN243]. Id. at Article 7. 
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[FN244]. See Guanyu Jingyi Bu Jiaqiang Zhengfu Caigou Jiandu Guanli Gongzhou De Yijian [Opinions 
on Further Strengthening the Supervision and Management of Government Procurement] (promulgated 
by Qingdao City Gov., Feb. 23, 2012, effective Feb. 23, 2012) (P.R.C.). 
 
[FN245]. Opinions on Further Strengthening the Management of Government Procurement, supra note 
237, at Preamble. 
 
[FN246]. Ma, supra note 39, at 69. 
 
[FN247]. E.g., Zhang Hui, Wogou Zhengfu Caigou Fa Shixing Xiaogou Kaocha [[Study on the Effec-
tiveness of the Implementation of China Government Procurement Law], Tianjin Fin. Univ. Rev. 120 
(2012). 
 
[FN248]. While SMEs participation in government procurement is arguably easy to quantify and is indeed 
required under Article 12 of the Temporary Measures, these statistics do not take into account the possi-
bility of circumvention of the Temporary Measures. Over emphasis of these statistics will also further 
exacerbate the perverse incentives of the government procuring authority in overlooking violations that 
will prop up the numbers. See supra IV.D.1. 
 
[FN249]. At a meeting at the White House in January 2011, the President of China agreed to equal 
treatment on innovations, leading the Chinese government to abolish procurement preferential policies to 
support indigenous innovation in July 2011: Ai Bing, Oumei guojia zhengfu caigou cujing zizhu chuanxin 
de jinyan yu qishi [Experiences and Lessons from Promotion of Indigenously Innovation Under European 
and American Government Procurement], Marco Econ. Research 13, 13 (2012). 
 
[FN250]. Zizhu Chuanxin Chanpin Zhengfu Caigou Pingshen Banfa [Measures on Evaluation of Gov-
ernment Procurement of Indigenously Innovated Products] (promulgated by Ministry of Fin., Apr. 3, 2007, 
effective Apr. 3, 2007, ineffective July 1, 2011) (P.R.C.) Article 12. 
 
[FN251]. Supra IV.B.2. 
 
[FN252]. Linarelli, supra note 36, at 448-50. 
 
[FN253]. Pierce, supra note 10, 549-61. 
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[FN254]. For a discussion on the legal hierarchy in China. See Albert Chen, An Introduction to the Legal 
System of the People's Republic of China 144-50 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2011). 
 
[FN255]. C. David Lee, Legal Reform in China: A Role for Nongovernmental Organizations, 25 Yale J. 
Int'l L. 363, 414-19 (2000). 
 
[FN256]. Xiaofei Zhe Quanyi Baohu Fa [Law on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Consumers] 
(promulgated by St. Council) (effective Jan. 1, 1994) Article 32(4). 
 
[FN257]. Id. at Article 32(6). This is usually in the form of legal advices or arranging law firms for 
consumers. C. David Lee, supra note 255, at 417. 
 
[FN258]. Supra II.C. 
 
[FN259]. 30% of the 741.32 billion government procurement in 2009. Zhang, supra note 4. 
 
[FN260]. Lubman, supra note 131, at 5-11. See Chen, supra note 254, at 218-25 (discussing the historical 
and contemporaneous context for the inadequacies in terms of quantity and quality of persons in Chinese 
legal institutions). 
 
[FN261]. Lubman, supra note 131, at 27-28. For a discussion of the law making process in China, see 
Chen, supra note 254, at 125-42. 
 
[FN262]. For example, during the drafting of the Government Procurement Law, a special overseas study 
mission was commissioned to study the government procurement regime in U.S., Australia, and Korea. 
Wang et al., supra note 161, at 303-12. 
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